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RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme"Judicial Court of Haine.
ALEXANDER DUNN v. GRAND TRUNK RAILWAY COMPANY
OF CANADA.
If a person enters the saloon-car of a freight railway train, and, when the
train starts, without being requested or directed to leave, remains there as a
passenger, contrary to the rules of the company, but with the knowledge of the
conductor, who receives from him the usual fare of a first-class passenger, the
corporation incurs the same liability for his safety as if he were in their regular
passenger train.

ON exceptions to the rulings of the Superior Court for the
county of Cumberland.
Case for an injury alleged to have been received in July,
1868, while being transported from South Paris to Danville
Junction, through the alleged insufficiency of the track and cars
of the defendants, and the careless and negligent manner of
managing them.
There was evidence tending to show that the plaintiff entered
the saloon-car attached to the defendants' freight train, at South
Paris station, for the purpose of going to Danville Junction;
that the conductor saw him when the train started, and they
conversed together; that he paid the conductor the usual fare
of eighty-five cents.; that the saloon-car was thrown from the
track and dumped; that the plaintiff was thereby injured; that
the car was thrown off by a broken rail, and that the fare was
thereupon faid back.
There was evidence on the part of the defence, tending to
show that the conductor notified the plaintiff when the train
started that he had no right to carry passengers on the freight
train, which was denied by the plaintiff.
It also appeared that the defendants issued a notice on May
23d 1866, that after that date "passengers would not be allowed
to travel by freight trains on that part of the line between PortOn September 8th 1868, they issued
land and South Paris."
notice that "no passengers will be carried in the brake-vans
attached to freight trains without written authority from the
superintendent. * * * Any conductor allowing a passenger to
travel in the brake-van, or on any part of the freight train, will
be dismissed."
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The defendants requested the presiding judge to instruct the
jury:
1. That the plaintiff was not entitled by law to be carried in
the freight train of defendant company as a passenger, unless
by permission obtained before he entered the train from some
-authorized agent of defendants; and that if the jury find that
plaintiff entered the freight train at South Paris without such
permission, then that plaintiff is not entitled to recover for the
alleged injury, and their verdict should be for defendants.
2. That if the jury find that the defendant company, before
the time of the injury received as alleged by the plaintiff, had
established and published a regulation by which passengers were
not allowed to travel by freight trains on that part of the line
between Portland .and South Paris, and that such regulation was
in force at that time, then the plaintiff is not entitled to recover
in this action, and their verdict should be for the defendants.
The judge did instruct the jury, inter alia, as follows: "I
understand that the defence is substantially this, that inasmuch
as notices had been issued and published by the directors of the
company, prohibiting passengers from riding on freight trains,
therefore this passenger being upon a freight train, the company
was not liable for the injury that he received, though the company would have been liable if ho had been in a passenger train.
If there is any other defence, you have noticed it, and of course
you will give them the benefit of. it.
"I have been requested to give you a number of instructions
touching this particular point, all of which I decline to give
except this :
"I do instruct you, for the purposes of this case, that the plaintiff was not entitled by law to be carried on the freight train of
defendant company, as a passenger, unless by permission obtained
before he entered the train from some authorized agent of defendants. I give you that one, and no more. But I also instruct
you, that if you find .that the plaintiff was allowed by the conductor, upon his entering that car, and upon the starting of the
train, to remain as a passenger on that train, in a saloon-car;
that on a full knowledge of the facts, the conductor on that train
allowed and authorized that man to remain there without directing him to get off, or any attempt to put him off, and that afterwards he received from him pay as a first-class passenger, not
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only to the next station where the freight train was to stop, but
beyond that station to Danville Junction, a further point on the
road where the plaintiff desired to go (for I understand the evidence is that he was going to Lewiston, and Danville Junction
was the furthest possible point in that direction on this road),
then I instruct you that the defendant company cannot plead
their regulation in release of their ordinary legal liabilities, but
they are just as liable as if it had been a passenger train, and as
if there had been no notices, provided that the plaintiff was not
guilty of any fault or want of ordinary care himself."
The verdict was for the plaintiff, and the defendants alleged
exceptions.
P. Barnes, for the defendants, cited Lygo v. Newbold, 9 Ex.
302; Lucas v. Taunton & N. B. Railroad Co., 6 Gray 70; 2
Redfield 114, 3d ed. ; EBikns v. Boston & Maine Railroad Co.,
3 Foster 275; Robertson v. N.Y. &f. B Railroad Co., 22 Barb.
91; C. C. & C. B. v.Bertram, 11 Ohio 457.
T. R. -HaskelZ, for the plaintiff.
APPLETON, C. J.-The defendants are common carriers of
passengers and freight. They may carry freight in their passenger train, or passengers on their freight train. They have a
right to make all reasonable rules and regulations in the management of their business, with which those in their employ, or those
making use of their means of conveyance, are bound to conform
when informed of their existence.
By one of the regulations of the defendant corporation, after
May 23d 1866, passengers were not "allowed to travel by freight
trains on that part of the line between Portland and South Paris.
The regulation was a reasonable one, and the defendants were
authorized to make it. It is, however, fairly inferable from the
regulation itself that previously passengers had been permitted
to travel by the freight train. By'the notice of September 8th
1868, dated at Montreal, no passengers were to be carried in the
brake-vans attached to freight trains "without written authority
from the superintendent." And "any conductor allowing a
passenger to travel on the brake-van, or any part of the freight
train, will be dismissed."
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The plaintiff went aboard the freight train, in the saloon-car,
and was there with the knowledge of the conductor. It was the
duty of the conductor to inform him of this regulation, if it was
to be enforced, and request him to leave. If no notice was given
of this rule, and no request to leave, but instead thereof the usual
fare was received, he had a right to suppose himself rightfully on
board, and entitled to all the rights of a passenger. Every one
riding in a railroad car is, prindfacie, presumed to be there lawfully as a passenger, having paid or being liable, when called on,
to pay his fare, and the onus is upon the carrier to prove affirmatively that he was a trespasser: Penn. Railroad Co. v. Books, 7
Am. Law Reg. N. S. 529. If not being rightfully on board, and
being advised thereof, the plaintiff neglected or refused to leave,
the conductor had a right to remove him, using no more force
than was necessary to accomplish that object: Fulton v. G. T.
Railway, 17 Up. Can. 428; Hilliardv. Goold, 34 N. IL 230;
tate v. Goold, 53 Maine 279.
The regulations of the defendant corporation are binding on
its servants. Passengers are not presumed to know them. Their
knowledge must be affirmatively proved. If the servants of the
corporation, who axe bound to know its regflations, neglect or
violate them, the principal should bear the loss or injury arising
from such neglect or violation, rather than strangers. The corporation selects and appoints its servants, and it should be responsible for their conduct while in its employ. It alone has the right
and the power of removal.
A Passenger goes on board a freight train, enters the salooncar, and remains there when the train starts, against the rules
of the company, but with the knowledge of the conductor, and
is not directed or requested to leave, but pays the usual fare of a
first-class passenger to such conductor, and is injured on his passage by the negligence or carelessness of the railroad corporation.
Is be entitled to compensation for such injury? If inert matter
be injured or destroyed by the negligence or carelessness of a
common carrier, its owner can maintain an action, and recover
damages'as a recompense for such injury. Is the traveller entitled to the protection of the law, when the negligence of the
carrier destroys his goods,.and without its protection, when the
same negligence injures his health or breaks his limbs? If any
extraordinary danger arises from the violation of the known rules
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of the company, as by standing on the cars when in motion, the
passenger violating the rules assumes the special risks resulting
from such violation. But if the act of the passenger in no way
conduces to the injury received, the carrier must be held responsible for the necessary consequences of his negligence or want
of care: Baker v. Portland,10 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 559.
In Zump v. WV. J6 X. Railroad Co., 9 Rich. (S. C.) 84, there
were two cars on the train, and the plaintiff's seat was in the
forward car. Near the door on the rearward car was a notice that
passengers should not stand on the platform. The train was
running over an unfinished part of the road. The cross-ties
were too far apart, and were insufficiently spiked, and the accident arose from "the breaking of the cleat at the end of one
of the rails." All the other passengers were inside the cars, and
none of them injured. The defence was that the injury arose
from the plaintiff's own fault in standing upon the platform while
the cars were in motion. The verdict was for the plaintiff, which
the court refused to set aside, holding that whether the plaintiff
had notice that the platform was a prohibited place, and if so,
then whether under the circumstances his own act so contributed
to th7e injury as to exonerate the railroad, who were guilty of
negligence, were for the jury. The plaintiff's seat, "it will be
recollected,"

observes O'NEALE, J., "was in the forward car;

the notice proved was in the rear car, on the platform of which
he was standing when the accident occurred. That such notice
is not enough to change the liability of the company to a passenger, is, I think, clear from Story on Bailment, § 558. If the
conductor had said to the plaintiff, as was his duty, 'you are in
an improper place,' and he had then persisted in remaining, it
might have been that this would have excused the company from
any consequences which might have followed." An action was
brought against a railroad company by a passenger, while travelling in one of its gravel trains. The defendant asked the court
to instruct the jury that a railroad company was not liable for an
injury which might happen to one taking passage in a gravel
train, and not engaged in carrying passengers. This requested
instruction was held to be properly denied in Lawrenceburgh t
Up. 31iss. Railroad Co. v. Montgomery, 7 Porter (Ind.) 475, the
court holding that in a suit brought against a railroad for an
injury occasioned by a collision, it was not sufficient for the com-
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pany to show that the plaintiff was acting at the time in disobedience of a proper order to secure his safety, but that it
should also appear that the injury was occasioned by such isobedience. In Watson v. Northern Railway Co., 24 Up. Can.
(Q. B.) 98, the plaintiff, travelling in the defendants' train on a
passenger ticket, went into the express company's compartment
of a car. While there, owing to the negligence of the defendants' servants, the train, which was stationary, was run into by
another coming up behind it, and the plaintiff's arm was broken.
No person in the passenger cars was seriously injured. It was
proved that notice that the passengers were not allowed to ride
in the baggage-car was usually posted upon the inside of the
door of the passenger-cars, but it was not distinctly shown that
it was there on that day. The jury found that the plaintiff was
wrongfully in the car, but that he was not told where to go when
he bought his ticket, nor did the conductor order him out, and so
he was not to blame. "In my opinion," observes DRAPER, C. J.,
"the jury were warranted in finding that the plaintiff did not
so contribute (to the injury) as to deprive him of the right to
recover. Giving the fullest weight to the considerations urged
in the defence,-such as the ticket which the plaintiff had, the
notices stated to have been kept up in the cars, conceding the
plaintiff saw them, though it is not proved,-I do not think they
preclude the plaintiff from recovering, when the injury he sustained was occasioned by collision resulting entirely and directly
from the gross negligence of the defendants' servants." In
O'Donnel v. Alleghany Valley Railroad Go., 59 Penn. 239, in a
suit by an employee of a railroad company, who held the relation
of a passenger, the. court charged that the baggage-car is an improper place for a passenger to ride,-whether the rule against.
it was communicated to him or not, if he left his seat in a passenger-car and went into the baggage-car, it was negligence which
nothing less than a direction or an invitation of the conductor
could excuse,-and such invitation should not be inferred from
his having ridden there frequently with the knowledge of the
conductor without his objection. Held to be error.
That a railroad corporation cannot repudiate the acts of its
agents so as to free themselves from responsibility, for their
negligence, was held in Lackawanna & lBloomsburgh Railroad Co.
v. Chenowith, 6 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 93, when the agents of a rail-
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road company, contrary to the instructions and rules of the
company, at the request of the- owner of a freight-car, attached
it to a passenger-car, the plaintiff agreeing to run all risks, the
plaintiff having sustained a loss by the negligence of the defendant, brought his action for compensation. The same defence was
attempted as in the case at bar. The plaintiff was not a trespasser, "for," observes THOMPSOn, J., "he was there by permission,
and under the contract of parties competent to give him authority
to be there. * * * When, therefore, they (the defendants) consented to hitch on his (plaintiff's) car to the passenger train, even
at his urgent solicitation,-and we have not a particle of evidence
that other inducements to do the act were held out, excepting
freedom from responsibility as a consequence of the attachment,we must presume it was done with a view to the compensation to
be paid on the one hand, and the usual care to be exercised on
the other. The argument, however, is, that the plaifitiff was
guilty of such a wrong in asking for permitting his car to be
attached, that whether the act contributed to the disaster or not,
he is to be treated as a trespasser, and not entitled to any compensation for injuries not wilfully done. We think this is not the
law, unless,in a case ihere the will of an agent is controlled and
subverted by improper influences, he is induced to do that which
is manifestly beyond the scope of his powers. That there was a
regulation against running freight trains with passenger-cars may
be admitted, although it was not properly proved, yet that neither
proved that it might not be safely done, nor that if the company
undertook to do it, they might lay aside the duty of care, and
commit such cases to the guardianship.of chance."
When a railroad company admits passengers into a caboose-car
attached to a freight train, to be transported as passengers, and
takes the customary fare for the same, it incurs the same liability
for the safety of the passengers as though they were in the regular passenger coaches at the time of the occurrence of the injury:
Edgerton v. N. Y. & H. RailroadCo., 39 N. Y. (12 Tiffany) 227.
In Carrolv. N. Y. & N. H. Railroad Co., 1 Duer 578, the plaintiff, remarks BOSWORTH, J., "took a seat in the post-office apartment of the baggage-car. The position was injudiciously chosen,
and may be assumed to have been known to him to have been a
far more dangerous one than a seat in a passenger-car. He took
it with the assent of the conductor. He was not there as a tres-
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passer, or wrongfiuly as between him and the defendants. So
far as all questions involved in the decision of this action are
concerned, he was lawfully there." His being there was not
such negligence as would exonerate the defendants from the consequences of their negligence or want of care.
The plaintiff was not entitled by law to be carried on the
freight train contrary to the regulations of the defendant -company. They might have refused to carry him, and have used
force to remove him from the train. Not doing this, nor even
requesting him to leave,. but suffering him to remain, and receiving from him the ordinary fare, they must be held justly responsible for negligence or want of care in his transportation.
The question before the court was whether the defendants
were liable at all as common carriers. The defence was based
entirely upon a regulation of the company. There was no question raised as to the general obligations of carriers. Indeed
none is raised at the argument. The counsel for defendants rest
their defence on the rules of the company. The plaintiff had
paid the usual fare of a first-class passenger. The defendants
had received it, and had undertaken the transportation of the
plaintiff in their freight train, during the course of which he was
injured by their neglect or want of care. Under such circumstances, the judge said that they could not "plead their regulation
in release of their ordinary liabilities, but they were just as liable
as if it had been a passenger train, and as if there had been no
notice, provided plaintiff was not guilty of any fault or want of
ordinary care himself."
Undoubtedly a passenger taking a freight train takes it with
the increased risks and diminution of comfort incident thereto,
and if it is managed with the care requisite for such trains, it is
all those who embark in it have a right 'to demand: The Chicago,
B. & Q. Railroad Co. v. Hazzard, 26 Ill. 373. ." We have said
in -The Chicago & Galena Railroad Co. v. Fay, 16 Ill. 568,"
observes BREEZE, J., "that a passenger takes all the risks incident to the mode of travel, and the character of the means of
conveyance which he selects, the party furnishing the conveyance
being only required to adapt the proper care, vigilance, and skill
to that particular means; for this, and this only, was the defendant responsible. The passengers can only expect such security
as the mode of conveyance affords."
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If there was any peculiar risk incident to transportation on a
freight train, the counsel should have called the attention of the
-court to such special difference, whatever it may be. But "the
responsibility of a railroad .company for the safety of its passengers does not depend on the kind of cars in which they are carried, or on the fact of payment of fare by the passenger :" Ohio
d. Miss. Railroad Co. v. Mahling, 30 Ill. 9. "The evidence,"
says WALKER, J., in that case, "shows that the road had been
carrying passengers on their construction trains, and they must
be held to the same degree of diligence with that character of
train, as with their regular passenger coaches, for the safety
of the persons and lives of their passengers."
If the defendants claimed that they might exercise a diminished
degree of caution arising from the character of the train, they
should have requested a corresponding instruction.
The cases to which our attention has been called, so far as we
have been enabled to examine them, are inapplicable. In _ygo
Y. .Newbold, 9 Exch. 302, the plaintiff contracted with the defendant to carry certain goods for her in his cart. The defendant
sent his servant with his cart, and the plaintiff, by the permission
of the servant, but without the defendant's authority, rode in the
cart with her. On the way the cart broke, and the plaintiff was
thrown out and injured. Held, that as the defendant had not
contracted to carry plaintiff, and as she had ridden in the cart
without his authority, he was not liable for the personal injury
she had sustained. But in that case, it does not appear that the
defendant was a common carrier,-that he undertook to carry or
received, or was to receive any compensation for the carriage of
the plaintiff. In Lucas v. New Bedford & Taunton RailroadCo.,
6 Gray 65, it was held that a person who enters the cars of a
railroad corporation, not as a passenger, but for the purpose of
assisting an aged and infirm relative to take a seat as a passenger, must, in order to maintain an action against the corporation
for an injury sustained while leaving the cars, show that he exercised due care, that the corporation was wanting in ordinary care,
and that such negligence was the cause of the injury; and if he
attempts to leave the cars after they have started, or finding
them in motion as he is going out, persists in making progress to
get out, he cannot maintain such action, if his attempt causes or
xontributes to the injury, even if the corporation give him no
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special notice of the time of departure of the cars, and are guilty
of negligence in starting the cars, and in a jerk occurring after
the first start, which negligence also contributes to the injury.
But in that case the plaintiff was not a passenger; he was not
there for the purpose of being transported. The servants of the
corporation could not know, and were not obliged to know, the
purpose for which he came aboard. Besides, the tlaintiff must
show due care. The implication from the case is, that with due
care on the part of the plaintiff, and negligence on part of the
corporation, the action was maintainable, and is adverse to the
defendants.
Exceptions overruled.
KENT, DICKERS0N, BARtOWS, and TAPLEY, JJ., concurred.
It cannot be denied that the foregoing case, there would seem to be no question
case is one of very great interest to she in regard to the soundness of the views
profession; and the opinion of the presented in the opinion.
But the case of a passenger injured
learned Chief Justice is drawn up with
"
great care and after very deliberate exa- upon a freight train deserves unquestionmination of the cases bearing upon the ably a very different consideration from
questions involved. We are all accus- one, .)vhen the injury occurs upon a
tomed to accept the opinions of that passenger train. Upon the latter the
court with so much deference and re- conductor represents the company to the
spect, that we question whether any com- fullest extent as it regards the entire
ment on our part will be regarded as of subject of receiving and tranisporting, as
much account. But we cannot disguise well as the safe delivery of the pasthe impression, made upon our owamind sengers. That is his regular employby the reading of the statement of the ment, and in all that pertains to such
trial in the court below, that the defend- employment the conductor stands in the
ants might very naturally have regarded place of the company; and his acts, and
the instructions of the learned jvsdge his declarations accompanying such acts,
as requiring of them a somewhat severe will bind the company to the fullest
measure of duty. The opinion of the extent. And this is true even as to his
Chief Justice in the Supreme Court omissions and the concessions thereby
seems to escape most of the rigors of the fairly implied. As, for instance, when
case, as presented in the court below, by the passengers are allowed, by the conway of presumption or inference, from ductor, to pass from car to car, while
the admitted facts in the case. Itseemsto the train is in motion, or to stand upon
be assumed, both in the court below and the platforms, or to sit in the baggage
in that of last resort, that the plaintiff or express cars, there can be no fair
was rightfully upon the train, at the question, that the company will be bound
timethe damage or injury occurred, and by his act.
And we should not be inclined to
that the defendants had made themselves
common carriers of passengers so far as doubt, that where this, or any similar
the plaintiff was concerned. And if freedom, is constantly alloved the pasthat point is clearly established in the sengers upon passenger trains, without
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objection or remonstrance on the part
"ofthe conductors, the company must be
regarded as having acquiesced in the
practice, although in conflict with their
general regulations, properly advertised
in the cars. We suppose some such
relaxation is found indispensable on the
American railways, in order to keep
the peace with the passengers. For
among us there is a considerably numerous and influential class of passengers,
who almost insist upon perfect freedom
of locomotion and observation, in all
places and under all circumstances.
The propensity proceeds doubtless from
different motives, in different persons.
Some do it from mere listlessness and
unrest; others from curiosity and to
satisfy a morbid sense of inquisitiveness ; and others still to show they
can do it, and not suffer detriment.
There are doubtless many other reasons,
as to find out friends and acquaintances,
&c. But certain it is, no conductor can
control or hinder it if he were ever so
much disposed to do so. People, in
this country, will insist upon making all
the railway tracks common highways
for foot passengers ; and equally upon
climbing about in all directions upon
moving passenger trains; and there
seems to be no remedy, but to submit
to it. They all feel, that it is unsafe for
others, but indispensable for themselves
to do so. And it' railway companies
are compelled to submit to it, all that
we can say is, that the blame cannot be
thrown upon their servants but must rest
upon themselves. But the cases of passengers and strangers are by no means
analogous. There is, for instance, no
implied permission to a stranger to walk
upon a railway track, because the roadmaster does not drive him off, as he
doubtless might, if he chose. But having no responsibility in the matter, he
is not obliged to do so; and no implied
assent is the result of his omission
to do so. But in the case of pasVOL. XIX.--40

sengers it is different. They are,
for the time, under the control of the
conductors, and their duty is to put them
in a safe place, and keep them there.
And if they offer to violate the rules
of the company, by riding upon the
platforms, or in the baggage car, or in
any other mode out of the ordinary and
safe course, it is the right and the duty
of the conductors to forbid them, in the
most peremptory manner, and if they
persist in their courseI to compel them
to desist by force, if need be. And if
the conductors do not exercise their
right and duty in these particulars, they
must be regarded as having assented to
the course pursued by the passenger,
subject of course to the increased risk,
thereby incurred, being borne by such
passenger. And, subject to this qualification, the act of the conductor, upon
a regular passenger .train, must be
regarded as binding the company to an
assent to carrying the passenger in that
mode. And the same would be true,
probably, if some foolhardy passenger
(of which there are multitudes all over
the country, especially during the summer excursions, in search of new adventures), should insist upon standing upon
his head, or lying his full length upon
the platform of the cars during the
entire passage. The company must be
regarded as bound by the act of the conductor, if he did not forcibly prevent it,
at least to the extent of stipulating to
carry the passengers in that mode, as
safely as it was practicable to do in that
peculiar mode of transportation. If the
passenger was damaged in consequence
of his foolhardiness, in persisting in
riding in that particular mode, he could
not recover of course. But if he could
show that his peculiar mode of riding
did not contribute to his injury, but that
it resulted wholly from the negligence
of the company, he might unquestionably still recover.
But as we understand the settled law
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upon the subject, in regard to passenger
transportation upon freight trains, the
rule of implication, as against the companies, resulting from the acts, declarations, and acquiescence ofthe conductors,
is entirely different, we might say the
reverse, from what it is upon passenger
trains. Upon the freight trains of a
railway company the conductors have
no implied authority to bind the company
by allowing persons to be carried aspassengers. Every one is presumed to
have notice, that railways do not carry
passengers upon their ordinary freight
trains, and that if one is allowed to pass
upon them as a passenger, it is conceded as a favor and subject to the implied condition, that they will incur the
additional risk and inconvenience necessarily incident to that mode of transportation. This rule has been often declared and is rec6gnised in the principal
case as well as in many others: Alurch
v. Concord Railway, 29 N. H. 9, where
the question is discussed and very fairly
presented by Mr. Justice BELL.
" The stage proprietor is a carrier of
passengers by his coaches, but he does
not thereby become a common carrier
of passengers by his baggage wagons,
if he carries on that business at the
same time. Both the companies and
the individuals, in these cases, are bound
to their customers by the same duties
relative to their freight trains and baggage wagons, and have the same rights
as to the roads over which they travel,
as if they had no connection with the
business of common carriers of passengers." ** **
"The first question
which arises upon the point is, whether
the railroad comjanies have made themselves common carriers of passengers
by the freight trains * * * 7" "It is
very clear that a wagoner, who occasionally carries a passenger upon his wagons
as a matter of special accommodation
and agreement, does not thereby become a common carrier of passengers.

/He only becomes such when the carTying of passengers becomes an habitual
business. * * * Upon the evidence stated
in the case that ' both roads had been in
the habit of occasionally transporting
some passengers upon the freight
trains, when they were antious to
go,' we think we should not be justified in saying that they were common
carriers of passengers upon their freight
trains: Elken v. B. 4- M., 3 Foster
275."1
It seems to us that this presents the
question in its true light, and we should
seriously question, whether a conductor
of a freight train can fairly be said
to have any authority to bind the
company, by accepting passengers upon
his freight trains. It seems to us that
justice to the companies requires, that
any one who rides upon a freight train
should be required to show permission
to do so from the superintendent of the
road, just as much as if he were riding
upon the engine, in order to show himself
rightfully upon the train. The conductor
of a freight train has no more right'to
accept passengers for transportation,
than has the baggage-master or the
engineer upon a passenger train, to allow
passengers to ride with them in their
departments.
We have always maintained the necessity of holding railways
to the strictest responsibility in regard
to passenger transportation. But we
should, at the same time, require passengers to submit obediently to all the
just requirements of the companies, and
if they needlessly and understandingly
departed from them, to accept the consequences in patient submission. If
railway companies run passenger cars
upon their freight trains, or in any other
mode invite passengers to accept passage upon them, the company are bound
to the same degree of responsibility as
if they carried them in regular passenger trains. But where this is only
occasional and for the accommodation
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of the passenger, the rule of construe- it seems to us, the conductor of the
tion should be, we think, in favor of the freight train was not; but we urge this
company and the passenger be required view with hesitation against so high
to show clearly that he rode in that authority.
mode by the consent of the proper
L F. R.
agent of the company, which in this case,

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.
JULIUS TYLER

AND ANOTHER V.

ALFRED TODD.

In a suit against the defendant as endorser of a promissory note, the question
being whether the endorsement was genuine or forged, and the defendant claiming that his name had been forged to a large number of notes of the same maker,
and that this was one of them, the plaintiffs introduced a witness who testified
that he received the note from the maker and sold it to one E., from whom it appeared that the plaintiffs received it. Held, that on cross-examination he might
be inquired of as to having purchased other notes with the defendant's name
endorsed thereon, such evidence tending to show that the witness might be mistaken in relation to the particular note by confounding it with some of the others.
The defendant testified in his own behalf that he had received forty-eight
notices of protest as endorser of notes of the same maker from banks within a few
months, and stated the amounts of the notes. Held, that this evidence was admissible in connection with his previous testimony that he had endorsed but one of
the notes protested, as tending to prove that there was a large number of forgeries, a fact material to be shown in order to establish an alleged confederacy between the maker of the notes and certain other parties.
Questions of this character, involving a great variety of transactions with the
accompanying circumstances, often require the testimony to take a wide range.
Where it does not appear clearly on what ground testimony objected to was
admitted, and it was admissible for any purpose, the court cannot regard it as
having been admitted for an improper purpose.
Where an objectionable question was asked and was permitted on objection by
an auditor, but the witness in his answer stated only a fact that was admissible
in evidence, it was held that the impropriety of the question was not a sufficient
reason for setting aside the auditor's report.
Where the same question was repeated and the witness answered it in a manner
that was in itself inadmissible, but the counsel at once disclaimed it as evidence,
it was held that the impropriety of the question and answer was not a sufficient
reason for setting aside the auditor's report.
Where a witness was introduced as an expert in judging of the genuineness of
signatures, it was held to be proper for the party calling him to inquire of him as
to his residence, his occupation, and the length of time he had been engaged in
business that would qualify him to judge of signatures, and also to his actual
experience in such matters as a witness in court.
Upon the question whether a signature is genuine or forged it is the practice in
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this state to allow the disputed signature to be compared in court with others
that are genuine.
But for this purpose they must not only be genuine, but must be admitted or
proved to be such before they can be used, and a signature of which the genuineness is not thus established cannot be used even in a cross-examination of a witness to test his accuracy as to another signature.
An expert ought not to be permitted to give an opinion as to the genuineness
of a signature upon a comparison of signatures not before the court.
Where an expert testified as to his opinion from a comparison of signatures
made out of court, it was held that the opposing party had a right to object to the
evidence, but, not taking that objection, had no right to require the production of
the signatures so examined.
The defendant had testified that he had endorsed but nine notes signed by P.,
and that there were forty-seven notes made by P. upon which his name had been
forged as an endorser. To contradict the defendant evidence was offered by the
plaintiffs that six notes of P. had been shown to the defendant, purporting to be
endorsed by him, and that he had not repudiated them. Held that this evidence was
not admissible, unless it were shown that these notes were a part of the fortyseven which he disputed, and not a part of the nine which he admitted.
A witness cannot be inquired of on cross-examination as to irrelevant matters
for the mere purpose of contradicting him.
ASSUMPSIT against the defendant as an endorser of a promissory

note; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven county and
referred to an auditor. The plea was the general issue, with
notice that the defendant denied the genuineness of the endorsement of his name upon the note.

The auditor found the issue for

the defendant, and the plaintiffs remonstrated against the acceptance of the report.

The Superior Court found the facts upon the
remonstrance, and reserved the questions arising thereon for the

advice of this court.

The case is sufficiently stated in the

opinion.
Doolittle, with whom was C. Ives, for the plaintiffs.
Baldwin, for the defendant.

CARPENTER, J.-The question before the auditor was, whether
the name of Alfred Todd on the back of the note in suit was a

genuine or false signature.

It was claimed that his name had

been forged to a large number of notes, amounting in the aggregate to a large sum, and that this was one of the forged notes.
The auditor found the issue for the defendant, and the plaintiffs
remonstrated against the acceptance of the report. The questions
raised on the remonstrance will be considered in their order.
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1. Francis Warner, a witness introduced by the plaintiffs, testified in chief that he received the note in suit from Richard
Platt, the maker, that he sold it to Eneas Warner, from whom it
was found that the plaintiffs received it, and that it was signed by
R. Platt. All the questions put in the cross-examination, which are
objected to, relate to the'purcbase of other notes from the same
maker, many of which had the name of the defendant endorsed'
thereon. We do not see why that was not a legitimate crossexamination. It might tend to show that the witness was mistaken in relation to the 'matter testified to by him in chief, by
showing that he had confounded this note with some one of the
many other notes. If so, the auditor was clearly right in receiving the evidence.
2. The defendant was asked how many notices of protests of
R. Platt's notes from banks he had received in the last few
months. He replied, "forty-eight;" and stated the amounts of
the notes, &c. This testimony, by itself, was not important; but,
in connection with the fact previously sworn to, that he had
signed but one of the notes protested, tended to prove, if the witness was believed, that there were a large number of forgeries
outstanding, a fact material to be shown in order to establish the
alleged confederacy between Platt, Warner and Smith. And we
think also that it was relevant to the main issue. Questions of
this character, involving as they do a great variety of transactions
with the accompanying circumstances, often require the testimony to take a wide range. This was evidently one'of those
cases, and the testimony was properly admitted.
3. The case does not state clearly on what ground the testimony
relating to the Goodsell note was received, or for what purpose it
was used. The defendant now claims that Platt was a reluctant
witness, that he had reason to suppose that he would testify to
the combination, as he had previously, as it is claimed, testified
in effect to the same thing in an affidavit, and that the questions
put were designed and adapted to elicit such testimony. If that
was all there was to it, we think it was within the discretionary
power of the court to permit the questions to be put. If the testimony was limited to that the plaintiffs have no cause of complaint.
Inasmuch as it does not appear for what purpose it was received
and used, and we can see that for one purpose it might have been
legitimately received, although for other purposes it might be
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inadmissible, we cannot say, as matter of law, that it was received
for an illegitimate purpose.
4. The question put by the defendant to the same witness, "Do
you know of anything which causes you to believe that Henry F.
Smith wrote the name of Alfred Todd on any note or notes signed
by you during the summer or fall of 1868 ?" was objectionable,
in form and substance, and should not have been permitted. But
the fact sworn to in response, that there were more notes out
than he could account for, was admissible. The answer being
proper and admissible, we do not think the impropriety of the
question a sufficient reason for setting aside the report. The
second answer, in response to a repetition of the question, was
clearly inadmissible, and would have been a sufficient reason for
setting aside the report, had not the defendant's counsel, in the
time of it, disclaimed it as eyidence. If the case had been on
trial to a jury, it might be questionable whether the evidence
would not have some effect notwithstanding the disclaimer, but
with a court accustomed to try causes and to distinguish between
the legitimate and illegitimate effect of evidence, we cannot believe that any injustice was done.
5. The principal matter sworn to by William Hull was material to the issue and not objected to by the plaintiffs. The fact
that was objected to was introductory merely, and only important
as being a part of the transaction. As such it was clearly
admissible.
6. W6 see no objection to the testimony of Paine. He was
introduced as an expert. As a preliminary fact it was necessary
to show that he was one. For that purpose it was proper to
inquire of him as to his residence, his occupation, and the length
of time he had been engaged in business that would qualify him
to judge of handwriting. We also think it was proper to show
that he had had actual experience in such matters as a witness.
Moreover it tended to show the estimation in which he was
held by those who knew him best, and was admissible upon the
same principle that we sometimes allow a party in the first instance to show that a stranger witness sustains a good character
for truth and veracity at home: 3ilerriam v. Hartford . N.
Haven R. R. Oo., 20 Conn. 354; Rogers v. Moore, 10 Conn. 18.
7. The rule prevailing in England, and some of the states, excludes a comparison of handwriting in cases of this character.
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But in this state we allow the disputed signature to be compared
with signatures admitted or proved to be genuine. The triers
may compare and judge for themselves, and experts may, upon
comparison, give their opinions. But the signature used as a
standard of comparison must not only be genuine, but must be
admitted or proved to be such before it can be used. No case
has come to our knowledge in which the signature written by
another party, or a disputed signature, has been used for any
such purpose. While we do not question the propriety of the
rule adopted-ih this state, we are not disposed to extend it so as
to embrace false or disputed signatures. This limitation of the
rule is necessary in order to avoid confusion and collateral issues.
And we think the same rule with the same limitation should apply
to cases where the object is, as in this case, to test the accuracy
of an expert. The same evils result from the introduction of
such testimony, whether introduced for one purpose or the other.
The law in Massachusetts in respect to a comparison of handwriting is similar to our own. The Supreme Court of that state,
in Bacon v. Williams, 13 Gray 525, held that a disputed signature could not be used in cross-examination of a witness to test
his accuracy as tp another signature.
We think therefore that the auditor did right in refusing to
allow the signature written by the plaintiffs' counsel to be used
in the cross-examination of the witness.
8. The question relating to the testimony of Mr. Bristol seems
to be this. He at first testified in behalf of the plaintiffs that he
believed the signature to be genuine. Subsequently, at the instance of the defendant, he testified that he had again examined
the signature, and was of the impression that it was counterfeit.
On .a cross-examination by the plaintiffs it appeared that the
change in his opinion was in part the result of a comparison with
other signatures, not before the court, some of which were said
to be genuine and others not. The plaintiffs then insisted that
those signatures should be produced; but the auditor overruled
this claim. We agree with the plaintiffs' counsel that an expert
should not be permitted to give an opinion formed upon a comparison with signatures not before the court. Hence if the testimony had been objected to when the fact appeared, it would have
been the duty of the court to exclude it, unless under the circumstances it was admissible as affecting his previous testimony. But
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if admissible at all for any purpose, its forcq as an opinion must
have been materially weakened, if not entirely destroyed, by the
matter elicited by the cross-examination. The plaintiffs took no
exception to the testimony, but the presumption is that they had
the benefit of having it weighed in connection with the facts. In
one or the other of these ways the plaintiffs had their remedy;
but we do not think they had a right to demand the production
of the signatures, and thus cumber the case with a multiplicity
of collateral issues. But if we are wrong in this, there is another
view of the question which is conclusive against the plaintiffs.
The question calls for the genuine and false signatures alike. If
upon any principle they were entitled to the former, they clearly
were not entitled to the latter. If a party group together admissible and inadmissible testimony, and insists upon the admission
of the whole, the court is not bound to make the distinction, but
may reject the whole together.
9. Before the testimony, offered by the plaintiffs, that six notes
were shown the defendant in the month of August 1868, and not
repudiated by him, as referred to in the 9th reason of the remonstrance, could have any effect by way of contradicting the defendant, who had testified that he had endorsed but nine notes, signed
by R. Platt, after the preceding April, it was necessary to show
that said notes were not a part of the nine, but were in fact a
part of the forty-eight, claimed to be forgeries. As that did not
appear, and the testimony offered was unaccompanied with any
offer to make such proof, we think the auditor did right in excluding it.
10. The plaintiffs, in the cross-examination of Joseph R. Platt,
elicited matters which had no relation to the matters testified to
by the witness in chief.
To lay the foundation for contradicting him, the question
stated in the remonstrance was put to him, but the auditor excluded the question, and rejected the evidence. It is not pretended that the note, referred to in the question, bad any relation to the note in suit. It was irrelevant matter, and the rule is
too well settled to require argument, that a witness cannot be
inquired of respecting such matters, for the mere purpose of contradicting him.
O4 the whole, we advise the Superior Court to accept the
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auditor's report, and render judgment thereon for the defendant.
In this opinion the other judges concurred, except
C. J., who did not sit.
The foregoing case can scarcely fail
to interest the profession, from the great
number of practical questions involved
in it.
1. The range of cross-examination.
It does not always seem to be remembered by courts, that if cross-examination. is to be allowed as a test of the
intelligence and fairness of the witness,
it becomes indispensable to these ends,
that it should be left to a great extent
to the discretion of the examining
counsel, both as to the mode adopted
and the range pursued. And the minds
of counsel seem, sometimes, equally
oblivious of the fact, that in conducting
such cross-examination, they are placed,
to a considerable degree, upon their professional honor. The very discussion
of the limits of cross-examination, in the
presence of the witness, at once puts him
upon his guard, and thus defeats most
of its beneficial effects. -Thereseems to
be, in the popularmind, a kind of admiration of coarseness and impudence on
the part of examining counsel; and the
counsel, too often it may be feared, aspiring to no higher merit than popular
admiration, lend themselves to an abuse
of professional privilege, in treating a
witness as a kind of volunteer combatant, defying all impeachment. There
could be no greater misapprehensions.
The witness is a portion of the court, so
to speak, brought there by compulsion,
and altogether indispensable to the ends
of justice, and as much under the shield
and protection of the court, as the
counsel are. It therefore greatly becomes
counsel to consult their own self-respect,
in framing their questions, and not to
forget that in browbeating a witness,

HINMAN,

they insult the court and bring discredit
both upon themselves and their client.
And on the other hand, counsel who
are conscious of having a good cauze
and honorable witnesses, will not be over
sensitive in regard to the reasonable
allowance of cross-examination.
The
most absurd and the most damaging
course to his own side, is the course not
unfrequently pursued by counsel of crosiexamining his adversary's witnesses
upon every pointof their testimony, from
beginning to end, thus compelling the
witnesses to reaffirm every point of their
testimony, in the minutest detail, and
thus supplying any defects which may
have occurred in putting in the testimony. It is certain that in the great
majority of cases, the adversary's case
is Tortified by the cross-examination of
his witnesses, and in not a few, a defective case is supplemented and made out,
whereas, if left upon the examination
in chief, the party must have failed.
This may look like exaggeration, but
we feel sure it is not.
2. In regard to the comparison of a
disputed signature with those which are
genuine, it must be remembered, that
the fact of its genuineness must be shown
beyond all question, either by the admission of the party, or by the testimony
of some one who saw the author make,
or admit the genuineness of the signature
used for comparison. Unless this were so
the experts and the jury might be comparing two fabricated signatures with
each other. The English rule restricts
comparison of handwriting to documents already in the case for some legitimate purpose connected with it ; and
does not allow the resort to merely spe-
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culative comparisons; and it must be justice: 1 Greenl. Ev. J 578 et seq.,
confessed there are some cogent reasons Doe v. Suckermore, 5 Ad. & Ellis 703,
against such a course. It enables the 731, and other cases cited by Mr. Greenparties to select signatures suited to leaf.
I. F. R.
their ends rather than those of truth and

Supreme Court of Errorsof Connecticut.
LINCOLN v. McCLATCHIE.
The defendant in the month of March put into the hands of the plaintiff, a realestate broker, for sale, a house in a certain city street, at the price of $6500; the
plaintiff to receive a commission of I per cent. if he sold the house, the defendant
to have the right to sell it himself without being liable to a commission, and the
plaintiff not to advertise. The plaintiff entered the house on his books, and in
December and January following advertised houses for sale on that street. G.,
who lived on the street and was desirous of finding a house near by for a friend,
saw the advertisement and went to the plaintiff's office and learned that the
defendant's house was for sale. He informed his friend, and the latter went to
the defendant and negotiated with him for it and finally purchased it. The purchaser did not see the plaintiff nor go to his office, and G.'s action in the matter
was wholly voluntary : Held that the plaintiff was entitled to his commission.
A sale made by the defendant, upon which the plaintiff was to have no commission, held to mean a sale to a purchaser found by the defendant wholly without
the plaintiff's procurement.
The plaintiff, by some misunderstanding, had altered the entry of the price on
his books from $6500 to $6000, and gave the latter price to G. when he inquired.
The defendant's price remained $6500, and he sold the house for $6400: Held
that the plaintiff was still entitled to his commission.
ASSumPSIT,

to recover a commission for the sale of real estate,

claimed to be due to the plaintiff as a real-estate broker; brought
to the Superior Court in Hartford county. The following facts
were found by an auditor to whom the case was referred:
On the 14th of March 1866, the defendant left with the plaintiff, a real-estate broker in the city of Hartford, upon sale, a
certain piece of real estate, with house and buildings, upon Canton street, in Hartford. The plaintiff was instructed not to
advertise the place, but was to sell it at private sale for $6500,
and in case of such sale he was to receive 1 per cent. as a commission. The defendant was to have the right to sell it himself,
and in that case the broker was to have no commission or pay.
The plaintiff entered a description of the place, with particulars
of price, &c., in his descriptive-book, kept in his office for consul-
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tation by his customers. Subsequently the plaintiff reduced the
price upon his descriptive-book to $6000, supposing that he had
the defendant's consent, which the latter had not in fact given
him.
In December 1866, and in January 1867, the plaintiff advertised houses upon Canton street for sale. One Goodwin resided
upon Canton street, and had been looking for a house suitable
for a friend of his named Burdick. He also took an interest in
real-estate matters generally, particularly in his neighborhood.
He was attracted by the advertisement to the plaintiff's office,
where he learned from the plaintiff that the defendant's house
was for sale. The plaintiff gave him $6000 as the price. Goodwin subsequently informed Burdick that McClatchie's house was
for sale at $6000. Burdick asked him to look at it and report
to him. He did so, and advised Burdick to buy. Burdick then
examined the house himself, and soon after entered into negotiation with the defendant personally, which resulted in the defendant's selling to Burdick the place (with a few articles of personal
property worth less than $100), for $6500, on the 18th of February 1867. Burdick had n~o personal intercourse or dealing
with the plaintiff. Goodwin's connection with the plaintiff in the
matter was voluntary. Goodwin informed Burdick before he
purchased that the house was in the plaintiff's hands for sale at
$6000.
If upon the foregoing facts the court should be of opinion that
the defendant was not legally liable to the plaintiff, the auditor
found the defendant not indebted; but if the court should be of
opinion that upon the facts the defendant was liable, then the
auditor found the defendant indebted to the plaintiff in the sum
of .$64, with interest from February 18th 1867.
The Superior Court rendered .judgment for the defendant, and
the plaintiff brought the record before this court by a motion in
error.
f yde and Jones, for the plaintiff.
Cole, for the defendant.
PARK, J.-If Burdick, the purchaser, had gone to the office
of the plaintiff to ascertain what real estate there was for sale
and there obtained all the information that was communicated to
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Goodwin, and in consequence thereof had opened a negotiation
with the defendant to purchase and had finally purchased the
premises, the counsel for the defendant concede that he would
have been liable: Murray v. Carrie,7 Car. & P. 584; Wilkinson
v. Martin, 8 Id. 1; Burnett v. Bouch, 9 Id. 620.
But the claim is, that the fact that the information that Burdick received was communicated to him by Goodwin, who received
it from the plaintiff while he was not acting as the agent of Burdick in procuring it, materially alters the character of the transaction, and renders the defendant not liable to the plaintiff.
It appears that Goodwin was the personal friend of Burdick,
and knew that the latter wished to purchase a dwelling-house.
His friendship pi'ompted him to search for a suitable place for
his friend that was for sale. He saw an advertisement of the
plaintiff of houses for sale upon Canton street, and went to his
office for information about them. He there learned that the
defendant had a house for sale, and was told the price. This
information he communicated to Burdick, and informed him that
the house was in the plaintiff's hands for sale. Burdick thereupon requested Goodwin to examine the premises and report to
him. Goodwin did so, and advised Burdick to purchase. Burdick then examined the house himself, and soon after entered
into negotiation with the defendant to purchase, which resulted
in a sale.
Had Burdick in the first instance requested Goodwin to do
what was done by him in this transaction, the case would have
stood precisely as if Burdick had procured the information himself from the plaintiff, on the principle qui facit per alium facit
per se, and the defendant in that case would clearly have been
liable. Is the case materially different? Goodwin acted for
Burdick in procuring the information. He did not casually obtain it, but went to the office of the plaintiff to ascertain what
intelligence he had to disclose. Burdick acted upon the information when communicated to him by Goodwin, knowing from what
source it had been obtained. He adopted the acts of Goodwin,
which was equivalent to a previous 'request to perform the acts.
The plaintiff was pursuing the business of a broker in giving the
information, and Goodwin received it for Burdick in the capacity
of a messenger and conveyed it to him. Suppose Goodwin had
informed the plaintiff for what purpose he inquired, and the
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information had been given for the purpose of being communicated to Burdick, would the case for the plaintiff have been
stronger ? The information was given in order to procure a purchaser, and can the fact that Goodwin did not make known for
whom he was acting make any material difference, when his act
operated directly to bring the buyer and seller together? They
show that the plaintiff was the procuring cause of the sale, as
much as would have been the case if Goodwin had made known
his business, or Burdick had gone in person to the office of the
plaintiff and obtained the information himself.
The defendant further claims that he specially reserved the
right to sell the property himself, without being liable to pay a
commission to the plaintiff. We think the proper construction
of the understanding was, that the defendant should have the
right to sell to a purchaser found by him independezitly of the
plaintiff's procurement.
For these reasons we think there is manifest error in the judgment complained of.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The foregoing opinion seems to us
extremely valuable by reason of its
handling of a very common and sometimes perplexing qrestion in a very just
and common-sense manner. There seem,
as we might naturally expect perhaps,
to be two extreme views in regard to
commissions being due brokers, agents,
or factors, for the sale of commodities,
and especially of real estate. We mean
now, of course, in those cases where no
special contract or custom exists, which
might control the same.
1. It seems by those in the interest
of the brokers, to be supposed in the
absence of all special customs or contracts, that, where a broker is employed
to negotiate a sale, for which he is
to receive a specified or customary commission, that the commissions are
earned the moment the property is committed to the broker for sale, and that
the owner can have no control over the
property thereafter, either to withdraw

it or to make sale of it himself, without
first paying the broker his commission,
certainly not uniless he specially reserves
such right.
2. Thoie in the interest of the Tendors seem to suppose the broker has no
right to any kind of recompense for all
he may do or pay, by way of inviting
or negotiating a sale, unless he actually
consummates it.
The truth seems to lie between these
extremes, and in the precise line indicated in the opinion. The broker may
pursue his own mode in finding a purchaser; and there is, probably, an implied understanding, that if the vendor
shall withdraw his property or effect a
sale solely on his own account, he may
do so, but in that event he may be bound
to reimburse any expense the broker
may have incurred by advertising or
otherwise. But unless he contributed
to the sale made by the owner of the
property he is not entitled to commis-
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sions. Commissions, eo amine, can
only be earned by a complete sale; the
same as freight is the mother of wages,
and the completing of the voyage, under
ordinary circumstances, is required in
order to demand freight.
But if the efforts of the broker in fact
procure the purchaser, even where the
bargain is made with the owner, and
without his knowing of the fact that
the action of the broker procured the
purchaser, nevertheless, upon that fact
being disclosed, nothing can be more

reasonable or just than that the broker
should receive commissions: Durkee v.
Vermont Central Railway, 29 Vt. 127.
But if the broker find a purchaser at
the price required and the owner refuse
to sell, the broker will be entitled to
claim full commissions: Kock v. Emmerling, 22 How. U. S. 69 ; Bailey v. Chapman, 41 Mo. 536. So also where the
sale fails through defect of title: Doty
v. Miller, 43 Barb. 529; Topping v.
Healey, 3 F. & F. 325.
I. F. R.
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A. W. Stone, for defendant.
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not be lawful for the plaintiff to have a verdict or judgment in his
favor until he had made it clear to the tribunal trying the same,
that all legal taxes chargeable by law upon the same had been
duly paid for each year since the making of said debt or contract.
And further: In every trial upon a suit founded upon any such
contract, it is provided that said debt has been legally given in
for taxes and the taxes paid shall be a condition precedent to a
recovery on the same ; and in every such case, if the tribunal trying is not clearly satisfied that said taxes have been duly given in
and paid, it shall so find; and said suit shall be dismissed; and
defendant avers that the causes of action in the declaration mentioned were chargeable with taxes, which have not been given in
or paid.
The plaintiff demurs to this plea. The question is, whether
said statute is constitutional, and I am clearly of opinion that it.
is not. It imposes upon the plaintiff conditions for a recovery
which were not required to be performed when the contract was
made-conditions onerous, and if he has not paid the taxes,
impossible to be performed. It imposes a penalty and forfeiture
for non-payment of taxes, which it is conceded did not exist when
the taxes' were assessed and payable. It therefore not only
impairs the validity of a contract, but is an ex post facto law.
Restrictions on the remedy which materially affect a contract tend
as much to impair its validity as laws passed fo abrogate it.
They differ only in degree. I have no hesitation or-doubt on the
subject.
Judgment for plaintiff.
The foregoing decision possesses a
peculiar interest at the present time,
and especially as the same question as
to the constitutionality of the statute
of October 13th 1870, is now pending
before the Supreme Court of the state
of Georgia.
OnthellthMarch 1868, the" Georgia
Constitutional Convention" ordained
and adopted a constitution, the 3d subdivision of section 17, article 5, of which
reads as follows : "It shall be in the
power of the General Assembly to assess
and collect upon all debts, judgments,
or causes of action when due, founded

on any contract made or implied before
the 1st day of June 1865, in the hands
of any one in his own right, or as trustee, agent, or attorney of another on or
after the 1st day of January 1868, a
tax of not exceeding 25 per cent. to be
paid by the creditor on pain of the forfeiture of the debt, but chargeable by
him as to one-half thereof against the
debtor, and collectable with the. debt.
Provided, that this tax shall not be
collected if the debt or cause of action.
be abandoned or settled without legal
process, or, if in judgment, be settled
without levy and sale." -By an Act
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of Congress passed on the 25th of June
1868 to admit the states of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and other
states to representation in Congress, it
is. declared among other things "that
the 3d subdivision of the 17th section of
article 5 of the Constitution of Georgia,"
as above quoted, "shall be null and
void, and -that the General Assembly
of said state by solemn public act shall
declare the assent of the state to the
condition."
fundamental
foregoing
Public Laws U. S. 1867-8. On the
21st July 1868, the legislature of Georgia accepted and assented to the said
condition, leaving out the parts declared
null and void by Congress.
On the 13th October 1870, the same
legislature passed an act "to extend
the lien of set-off and recoupment as
against debts contracted before the 1st
June 1865, and to deny to such debts
the aid of the courts until the taxes
thereon have been paid ;" which is the
statute pleaded in the above case. To
this statute there are sixteen sections,
but it is not necessary to refer particularly to any others than those quoted by
the learned judge in his opinion. A
general demurrer to this plea brought
up the question of the constitutionality
of the statute.
. Judge BRADLxY has decided that the
act is unconsitutional. "It not only,"
remarks the judge, "impairs the validity of a contract, but is an ez post facto
law. Restrictions on the remedy which
materially affect a contract tend as much
to impair its validity as laws passed to
abrogate it. 7Tey differ only in degree."
Such has been the ruling of the Supreme Court of the United States in a
series of decisions from Bronson T. Kinzie,1 How. 315, decided in 1843, to Butz
v. Muscatine, decided in 1869, 8 Wall.
575. In the first case the court say:
"Whatever belongs merely to the remedy
may be altered according to the will of
the state, provided the alteration does not

impair theobligation of the contract. But
if that effect is produced, it is immaterial whether it is done by acting on the
rentedy or directly on the contract itself.
In either case it is prohibited by the
In Van Hoffman v.
Constitution."
City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535, the court
say: "'NO attempt has been made to
fix definitely the line between alterations of the remedy, which are to be
deemed legitimate, and those which,
under the form of modifying the remedy,
impair substantial rights. * * If these
doctrines were res integrcethe consistency
and soundness of the reasoning which
maintains a distinction between the contract and the remedy-or, to speak more
accurately, between the remedy and the
other parts of the contract-might perhaps well be doubted. But they rest in
this court upon a foundation of authority,
too firm to be shaken. * * * The doctrine
upon the subject established by the latest
adjudications of this court render the
distinction one rather of form than substance." In Butz v. City of 11uscatine,
8 Wall. 575, the court held "that a
remedy which the statutes of a,state
give for the enforcement of contracts
cannot be taken away, as respects previously existing contracts, by judicial
decisions of the state courts construing
the statutes wrongly. ** * It has been
uniformly held by this court that such
remedies are within the protection of
the Constitution of the United States,
and that any state law which substantially impairs them is as much prohibited
by that instrument as legislation which
otherwise impairs the obligation of the
contract. This subject was fully considered in Van Hoffman v. City of
Quincy, 4 Wall. 557."
The constitutionality of this statute
of Oct. 1870, is now before the Supreme
Court of Georgia ; and from recent
decisions delivered by that court, we are
constrained to believe that the statute
will be held to be constitutional. In
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1868, this courtlheld "that the provision
of the Constitution of the United States,
which denies to a state the right to pass
any law impairing the obligation of contracts, does not interfere with the right
of a state to pass laws acting upon the
remedy :" Cutts 4-JoAson v. Hardee, 38
Ga. 350; WAinEi, J., dissenting. This
decisioh was delivered upon the question
as to the constitionality of the ReliefLaw, passed in 1868. In 1869, the Constitutionality of the Homestead and Exemption Laws was before the court, and
the court held that "homestead and
exemption laws, though retroactive, do
not fall within the prohibition of article
10, see. 1st of the Constitution of the
United States, declaring that no state
shall pass any law impairing the obliga-

lion of a contract ;" and" that the Constitution of the United States does not
prohibit a state from divesting a vested
right, except when that right is vested
by virtue of, and under a contract of the
parties." • WARNEn, J., dissenting:
Hardeman v. Downer, 39 Ga. 425. If
this court could decide the Relief-Law
of 1868 and the Homestead and Exemption Laws of 1869 constitutional, it
will have no trouble in deciding the
Statute of 1870 constitutional, and for
the third time publicly disregard the
adjudications of the Supreme Court of
the United States -which "rest upon a
foundation of authority, too firm to be
shaken."
J. H. T.

United States Circuit Court, Northern Distriet of Georgia.
JEFFERSON C. FRENCH v. LEWIS TUMLIN.
Judgments of the courts of Georgia during the war are valid judgments so far
as relates to parties within their jurisdiction.
A judgment of a court of Georgia, in November 1861, for the purchase-money
of slaves, was a valid judgment when entered, and may be enforced now.
The provisions of the Constitution of Georgia that "no court shall have jurisdiction to enforce any debt the consideration of which was a slave or the hire
thereof," so far as it relates to contracts valid when made, is repugnauf to the
Constitution of the United States, and void.

THIS was an action of debt on a bond conditioned for the payment of a judgment obtained by one Chisolm (whose assignee
plaintiff was) in the Inferior Court of Cass (now Bartow) county,
November 25th 1861, but stipulating that "if the State Convention, to be held in December 1867, or any state legislature, shall
pass any resolution, ordinance, act, or law that shall relieve defendant from his constitutional and legal liability to pay said
judgment, or any part thereof, then defendant is to be relieved
and discharged from complying with said obligation in the same
way and manner, and to the same extent, that he is relieved and

discharged from the payment of the judgment," &c.
VOL. XX.--41
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Defendant pleaded among other things that there was no consideration for the bond, because the judgment therein mentioned
was utterly void, being rendered while the sovereign authority of
the state was displaced and its constitutional government overthrown, and whilst its functions were usurped by a spurious and
revolutionary government; and that said judgment was rendered
by and under said spurious and revolutionary government, and
was for the price and purchase-money of slaves, and for no other
cause; that plaintiff took said bond with notice of these facts,
and that he paid no value for the same, &c.
To this plea there was a replication and to the replication a
special demurrer, but these are not necessary to notice in the view
taken by the court.
Akin, Hammond & Son, and Dougherty, for plaintiff.
Bleckley, for defendant.
D. J.-The obvious intention of the plea is to show
that there was no consideration for the making of the bond; and,
under the code, want of consideration is a good defence. The.
object and design of the other matters stated in the plea are, that
the judgment is a nullity, because it was rendered in this state
whilst the rightful government was overthrown, and its place
usurped by a spurious authority; but if not void for that reason,
then it was void because it was rendered upon an undertaking
which cannot be recognised or enforced in this court, the price
and purchase-money of slaves. The other branches of the plea
may be passed over for the present. It is to the substantial elements alone of the plea that the court must look in giving judgment.
There is nothing indicated in the plea going to show that the
defendants, or either of them, in the action brought by Chisolm
in the Inferior Court of Cass (Bartow) county, had no notice of
the action, or that they questioned the jurisdiction and had their
plea overruled, and had no further remedy, or that for good reasons they did not appear and defend. And I find nothing in the
-record before me which states, or from which it can be inferred,
that defendants in that suit were not citizens of Georgia, and one
or both of them resident of Cass county, when the proceedings
were instituted.
ERSKINE,
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Had the Inferior Court, pending the action in 1861, jurisdiction of the parties and subject-matter of the suit brought by
Chisolm against Fields and Tumlin, and if so, was the judgment
for the purchase-money of slaves valid? and if valid, then can
this court recognise it now, and if necessary enforce it?
Neither of these inquiries is free from embarrassment. I learn
that these or similar questions now stand for argument on error
or appeal before the Supreme Court of the United States. And
had they not risen here, during the progress of a trial at bar, I
would have deferred judgment and awaited the decision of the
Supreme Court. But as they are directly presented by the
pleadings, I will pass upon them-not with hesitancy in the performance of a duty, yet not without diffidence in my ability to
perform it well. I shall be as brief as possible in"my remarks.
Looking to the first specific clause in the plea, that the judgment rendered on the 26th of November 1861 was void, for the
reason that it was pronounced during the rebellion, I refer to the
case Cuyler v. Ferrffl, 8 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 100. A suit
had been instituted in 1862 or 1863, by certain heirs, through
guardians, in'the so-called Superior Court of Chatham county,
in this state, to partition land. One of -these heirs was a citizen
of Alabama, the other of Georgia; but Dr. Cuyler, another heir,
was a citizen of Pennsylvania, and, at the time the suit was pending, a surgeon in the national army. He was notified, in accordance with the statutory laws of Georgia, by publication, to appear
and defend. He did neither. The court ordered the property,
as it could not be equitably devised, to be sold, and Cuyler's share
of the proceeds invested in Confederate bonds, which was done.
The other heirs received their moiety in Confederate treasury
notes. After the war, Cuyler filed his bill against Ferrill, who
had purchased the property, and the other heirs, to set aside the
proceedings. And I decreed them to be, so far as they concerned
Dr. Cuyler, utterly null and void, because that tribunal had no
jurisdiction of him or his estate. But as to the position of those
heirs who had voluntarily sought the aid of that court, I declined
to express any opinion. Had it been a point absolutely necessary for decision, I apprehend that I would have been warranted
in holding that they or their, guardians (as the case might be)
were by their own voluntary act estopped from denying the validity of the proceedings in the so-called Superior Court.
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In 1868 the Supreme Court of the United States, in The State
of Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 100, said: "It is not necessary to
attempt any exact definition within which the acts of said state
(Texas) government must be treated as valid or invalid. It may
be said, perhaps, with sufficient accuracy, that acts necessary
to peace and good order among citizens, such, for example, as
acts * * * providing remedies for injuries to person and estate,
and other similar acts which would be valid if emanating from a
lawful government, must be regarded in general as valid when
proceeding from an actual though unlawful government."
I think that the court meant to employ the term "remedies"
in the ordinary legal and judicial sense, and did not intend to
confine it to the redress of torts and injuries alone, but that it
should also apply to the enforcement of contracts. I do not
think that the judgment is void for the first special cause alleged
in the plea.
The next fact stated in the plea is, that the judgment was for
the price and purchase-money of slaves and for no other cause
whatsoever. Is the judgment invalid for this reason? The opinions which I have always entertained on the subject of slavery
-the buying and selling of human beings'-like sheep in the shambles-must be here laid out of view; for it is the duty of the
judge to declare the law of the case before the court, and to
forget, while discharging his official duties, his own private opinions. Time will not permit me to give a full exposition of my
views on this question. Therefore, in brief, if the contract was
for the price and purchase-money of slaves, and that contract was
the immediate subject of the action upon which the judgment of
the 25th of November 1861 was founded, the judgment, when
rendered, was, in the opinion of this court, valid. But it is said
that even if valid then it is not so now, or if valid now it cannot
be recognised, or (if necessary) enforced by this court; and the
first paragraph of section 17, article 5, of the state constitution
of 1868 is referred to. It is as follows :"No court or officer shall have, nor shall the General Assembly give, jurisdiction or authority to try or give judgment on or
enforce any debt, the consideration of which was a slave or slaves,
or the hire thereof."
The word "judgment" is not in this paragraph, but it is necessarily included in the term "debt," a judgment being but a debt
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of record-a chose in action-and in this state negotiable by
endorsement or written assignment like bills or promissory notes;
but the transferee takes it "subject to the same equities and
defences as the original plaintiff in judgment was." This provision of the constitution has been before the Supreme Court of
the state on more than one occasion. The leading case, however,
is Shorter v. Cobb et al., 39 Ga. 285. The opinion of the court'
(WARNER, J., dissenting) was delivered by Chief Justice BRowN.
Shorter, as bearer, sued Cobb upon a promissory note made in 1861,
and paybble twelve months thereafter; the note was given for
slaves, and the court below dismissed the action for want of jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the judgment.
I here remark that it was in accordance with certain Acts of
Congress that the state convention was called. A constitution
was framed and submitted to Congress, and certain portions of it
were stricken out by Congress. But the provision which I have
just read was allowed to remain. On this matter the Chief Justice in his opinion says: "But it is the constitution as amended
and approved by the Congress of the United States, by virtue
of their authority as the conquering power, to dictate a form of
government to the conquered, which is accepted by the people
of the state as an act of obedience to the conqueror, and not as
a matter of will or sanction."
He afterwards says, "that Congress is presumed to' have
sanctioned every word and line of it which, upon examination,
Congress did not, while amending it, require to be stricken out
or changed." From these propositions the Chief Justice draws
the following corollary: "The state has not pretended to destroy
the obligation of this class of contracts. She has simply said,
with the sanction of Congress in forming her new government,
that her (the state's) courts shall have no jurisdiction to enforce
them."
In Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 42, the court said that "it rests
with Congress to decide what government is the established one
in a state. For, as the United States guarantee to each state a
republican government, Congress must necessarily decide what
government is established in the state, before it can determine
whether it is republican or not."
This question is wholly political, its determination belongs exclusively to Congress, and, therefore, it is in no wise judicial in
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its nature. And it must not be forgotten that the executive,
judicial, and legislative departments of rthe United States,
though co-ordinate branches of the government of the nation,
are, in their powers and functions, separate and distinct.
In rejecting certain provisions in the constitution of the state,
or in allowing that relating to the inhibition placed upon the
courts to take jurisdiction of debts, the consideration of which
was a slave or the hire thereof, Congress did not, I apprehend,
in any wise mean to interfere with the constitutional powers and
functions of the judiciary department of the government, any
more than the judiciary would assume to control the admission
to Congress of senators or representatives. I cannot think otherwise than that Congress intended to leave the interpretation and
construction of that provision in the state constitution exclusively
and absolutely with the courts. This provision does not declare
that contracts for the purchase of slaves shall be void, but that
the courts shall not have jurisdiction or authority to enforce
them. Does it, then, contravene any portion of the 10th section
of the 1st Article of the Constitution of the United States, which
declares that "no state shall pass any bill of attainder or ex post
facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts ?"
In the case of Cohen v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 414, the court said,
that "the constitution and laws of a state, so far as they are
repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, are absolutely void." And in Cummings v. The State of 3fissouri, 4
Wall. 277, the court, Mr. Justice FIELD delivering the opinion,
declared certain parts of the Constitution of the state of Missouri
null and void, because they were in contravention of the 1st and
2d clause of this section.
I will now endeavor to ascertain and determine whether this
provision in the state constitution impairs the obligation of contracts. For this purpose the case of Von Hoffmnan v. City of
Quiney, 4 Wall. 535, may be relied upon, containing, as it does,
a clear and exact exposition. of this most important subject.
Mr. Justice SWAYNE, in delivering the opinion of the court,
said: "It is also settled that the laws which subsist at the time
and place of the making of the contract, and where it is to be
performed, enter into aid form a art of it, as if they were
expressly referred to and incorporated in its terms. This prin-

FRENCH v. TUMLIN.

ciple embraces alike those which affect its validity, construction,
discharge, and enforcement.
"Without the remedy, the contract may indeed, in the sense
of the law, be said not to exist, and its obligation to fall within
the class of those moral and social duties which depend for their
fulfilment upon the will of the individual. The ideas of validity
and remedy are inseparable, and both are parts of the obligation,
which is guaranteed by the constitution against invasion.
"It is competent for the states to change the form of the
remedy or to modify it otherwise, as they may see fit, provided
no substantial right secured by the contract is thereby impaired."
Applying these citations to the provision in the state constitution now under consideration, it will become obvious that it is in
direct conflict with the 10th section of the 1st article of the Constitution of the United States; indeed, it is not only an impairment of the obligation of the contract, but a denial of all remedies.
And, in the language of Mr. Justice SWAYNE, "A right without
a remedy is as if it were not. For every beneficial purpose it
may be said not to exist :" Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4
Wall. 554.
If contracts, entered into previously to the promulgation of the
president's proclamation of emancipation, the consideration of
which was the price and purchase-money of slaves, were then
valid under the laws of the United States and of the state of
Georgia, the aid of the courts must be given, if demanded, to
enforce them. But if such contracts were invalid, the provision
in the state constitution is mere surplusage.
There must be judgment quod recuperet on this plea.
I. The question in the foregoing case as
to the right to enforce by suit a note
given on the sale of slaves prior to
emancipation, was thought to be involved
in the case of Generes v. Campbell before
the Supreme Court of the United States
at its last session, and was argued there,
but the report (11 Wall. 193) shows
that the court took no notice of it, and
decided the case upon other grounds.
The same question also arose in another case which was on the docket of
the same court at the last term, and was

argued, but no opinion has yet been delivered. There is therefore no decision on
the subject by the Supreme Court of the
United States.
II. In Mc-Yealy V. Gregory,in the Supreme Court of Florida (April Term
1871), a question arose similar to that
in the foregoing case, viz. : tlie validity
of the 26th Sec., Art. 16, of the State
Constitution, prohibiting the bringing
of any suits after January 10th 1861, on
notes, bills,. &e., given for the purchase
of slaves, and the clause was held to be
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unconstitutional, as destroying the obligation of a contract.
The section is as follows: "It shall
be the duty of the courts to consider that
there is a failure of consideration, and
it shall be so held by the courts of this
state upon all deeds or bills of sale
given for slaves with covenant or warranty of title or soundness, or both,
upon all bills, bonds, notes, or other
evidences of indebtedness given for or in
consideration of slaves which are now
outstanding and unpaid ; and no action
shall be maintained thereon ; and all
judgments and decrees rendered in any
of the courts of this state since the 10th
day of January 1861 upon all deeds or
bills of sale, or upon any bond, bill, or
note, or other evidence of debt, based
upon the sale or purchase of slaves, are
hereby declared set aside, and the plea
of failure of consideration shall be held
a good defence in all actions to said suit;
and when money was due previous to
the 10th day of Jannary 1861, and
slaves were given in consideration for
such money, there shall be deemed a
failure of consideration for the debt;
Provided, That settlements and compromises of such transactions, made by the
parties thereto, shall be respected."
On appeal from the Circuit Court of
Calhoun County, dismissing a suit
brought by Adam Mc ealy against Gregory on a promissory note given for the
price of a slave purchased in 'March
1860-for want of jurisdiction to hear
and determine the same, IWESTCOTT,
J., after a careful review of the entire
subject, held:
1. The courts of this state derive their
jurisdiction from the state constitution.
They cannot assume jurisdiction not
granted, or which is denied, although
the effect may be that the obligation of a
contract cannot be enforced. The jurisdiction of the courts is no part of the obligation of a contract.
2. The last clause of Sec. 26, Art.

16, of the Constitution, providing that
,1 all judgments and decrees rendered in
any of the courts of this state since January 10th 1861 upon all deeds or bills,
&c., upon the purchase of slaves, are
hereby declared set aside, &c.," is legislative, not judicial action : it prescribes a rule for the action of the courts
in reference to a particular class of judgments upon their records; it is a
law operating retrospectively upon the
contract, and its effect is to make that
which was a good consideration for a
contract at the time and place it was entered into, not a good consideration;
this is to destroy the obligation of
the contract, and it is therefore void.
The abolition of slavery, or the emancipation of the slave, does not destroy
the right of action which the vendor of
the slave so emancipated has against the
vendee, who owned the slave at the time
of his emancipation, and any action of
a convention of this character, which
directs the courts to hold otherwise, is
void, as it impairs the obligation of a
contract.
3. If the purpose of the convention in
this clause was to destroy all the right
of the plaintiff in execution in this judgment, as a punishment for making this
species of property the subject of sale,
or for any other act, then viewed in this
aspect, it becomes a bill of pains and
penalties, and is void.
4. If it is regarded as the exercise of
judicial power by the convention, the
result of which is to set aside the judgment, then it is the exercise of a power
by the delegate which had not been conferred, and the delegate possessed no inlierent power of tile character here exercised : nor could such an act become
valid by reLciving the sanction of a majority of votes of the people.
A citizen of the United States, in
time of peace, has a right under the Constitution of the United States to have his
rights to property made the sulect of
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adjudication and investigation by no
other tribunal than one which is a part
of a government which is republican in
form, such as a Court of the United
States, or of a state, where the judicial
powers of government are confided to a
recognised judicial department, controlled in its judgments by the law of
the land; nor can the people, by a simple majority vote, give validity to the
void act of a body of delegates which
deprives the citizen of his property without due process of law.
II. In Osbornev.Nicholson, in the United States Circuit Court, for the Eastern
District of Arkansas, the court, CALDWELL, J., reached a different conclusion
upon the general question of the right
to recover on such contracts. We regret that the opinion is too long for our
pages, but give the abstract of the
argument as stated by the court itself.
1. The institution of slavery under
the Constitution of the United States,
was purely local in its character, and
confined to the several states where it
existed, and was the creature of positive
law, and this is true of all its incidents.
2. The Constitution of the United
States did not regard slaves as property,
but as persons; and it did not establish
slavery or give any sanction to it, save
in the single respect of the return of
fugitives from service.
3. A remedy on a contract which is
against sound morals, natural justice
and right, may exist by virtue of the
positive law under which the contract
was made ; but such remedy can only
be enforced so long as that law remains
in effect. As such remedy derives all
its support from the statute, it cannot
for any purpose survive its repeal.
4. The new Constitution of Arkansas
declaring that "all contracts for the
sale and purchase of slaves were null
and void," is not in conflict with the
clause of the Constitution of the United
States prohibiting any state from pass-

ing any law impairing the obligation
of contracts, which clause does not
operate so as to perpetuate the institttion of slavery or any of its incidents,
these being matters over which the
states had unlimited control.
5. The 13th amendment to the Constitution of the United States ipso facto
destroyed the institution of slavery and
all of its incidents, and put an end to
all remedies growing out of sales of
slaves.
7. In view of the 13th and 14th
amendments to the Constitution of the
United States, the court holds that a
remedy on a contract for the sale of
slaves is contrary to the spirit of their
provisions, against public policy, and
can not be maintained.
And again in Buckner v. Street, the
same court, CALDWELL, J., reasserted
its opinion to the same effect, holding:
I. Contracts for the purchase and
sale of slaves are against sound morals,
natural justice and right, and have no validity unless sanctioned by positive law.
2. A remedy on such contracts may
exist by virtue of the positive law
under which they were made, but such
remedy can only be enforced so long as
that law remains in force.
3. The l3th article of amendment to
the Constitution of the United States
repealed all laws sanctioning slavery,
and the traffic in slaves and the right
of action on slave contracts does not
survive such repeal, founded as it is on
the supreme authority of the people of
the United States.
4. The rule that statutes should not
receive an interpretation that will give
them a retrospective operation, so as to
divest vested rights of property, and
perfect rights of action, has no application, so far as relates to slaves and
slave contracts, in tlhe construction of
the 13th article of amendment of the
Constitution of the United States.
J. T. M.

LOUGEN v CARPENTER.

Supreme Court of Colorado.
MAHALA LOUGEN v. B. PLATTE CARPENTER.
By the statute of Colorado a mortgage is not assignable so as to cut out any
defence of the mortgagor, and the fact that it was given as security for a negotiable note does not alter its character in that respect.
The assignment of a negotiable note secured by mortgage carries the mortgage
with it as an incident, but this is so only in equity, and if the assignee comes into
equity to foreclose the mortgage he will be made to do equity in regard to any
defence the mortgagor may have against the original mortgagee.
A promissory note though secured by mortgage is still negotiable, and when a
holder for value who took in good faith before maturity sues on the note at law
he will be entitled to judgment for the full amount of the note; but if he goes
into equity to foreclose the mortgage the court will let in any defence that would
have been good against the mortgagee himself.
A. made a promissory note to B. and secured it by a mortgage, and also by a
quantity of wheat delivered to B. to be sold and the proceeds applied in payment
of the note. B. sold a portion of the wheat but did not apply the proceeds to A.'s
credit, and subsequently assigned the note and mortgage to C. On a bill in equity by C. to foreclose the mortgage, it was held that A. could recoup the value of
the wheat'sold by B. before the assignment.

ON appeal from the Jefferson District Court.
This was a bill in chancery to foreclose a mortgage filed by the
appellee as assignee of one Jacob B. Carpenter. The mortgage was given to secure a negotiable note. The mortgage
bore date March 5th 1867, and was payable to Jacob B.
Carpenter or his heirs or assigns, and was by him assigned
to the complainant on the 20th July 1867. The assignment
was properly recorded on the 7th February 1868.
The defendant in her answer denied all knowledge of the
assignment, and averred that at the date of said mortgage,
she, in addition to said mortgage security, delivered to the
said Jacob B. Carpenter, as collateral, and further security
for the payment of the said sum of money, specified in said
note and mortgage, one hundred and three sacks of good
merchantable wheat flour, then of the value of $1236, and
seven thousand five hundre'd pounds of wheat, of the value
of $450, which she alleged, said Carpenter agreed to sell
and apply to the payment of the sum due him on said note
and mortgage, or if not sold, to be returned on payment or
tender of payment of said note and mortgage. She further
charged, that said Carpenter sold said flour and wheat, and
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appropriated the sum to his own use, and refused to account
to her for the proceeds.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BELFORD, J.-The principle involved in this case has never
been before adjudicated on, in this territory, and in the states
where it has received judicial notice, the decisions are in direct
conflict.
It is claimed by the appellee that the note secured by the
mortgage is a negotiable note; that it was negotiated before due,
and that the assignee, being a bone fide purchaser of the note
without note, took it and the mortgage freed, and discharged
from all equities and defences that existed in favor of the mortgagor and againgt the mortgagee.
There is no evidence showing that B. Platte Carpenter had,
before or at the time of the assignment of the note, any knowledge of the wheat and flour given by lahala Lougen as further
security to Jacob B. Carpenter.
It is contended by the appellant, that having taken security by
way of mortgage, that security qualifies the rights of the mortgagee, and those claiming under him; and that when an action is
brought to foreclose the mortgage, that instrumenti together
with the note secured thereby, passes into the category of obliations to which defences and equities may attach and be made available, into whosesoever hands they fall. We are free to admit that
this question is surrounded with great difficulties, and deeply
regret that no settled and uniform rule exists in this country on
the subject. The Supreme Courts of Wisconsin, Michigan and
Illinois, so far as we have been able to discover, are the only
courts that have passed upon the matter in controversy. In llinois the rule is laid down as claimed by the appellant. They
hold there, that although the note secured by the mortgage is
negotiable, still it is open to whatever defences existed against
the mortgagee. A different rule obtains in Wisconsin and Michigan. Amid this conflict of authorities, we feel at liberty to
choose our course, and shall endeavor to follow that which in our
judgment is sustained by the better reason.
What relation does a mortgage sustain to a note secured
by it ?
In one sense it is a mere incident to the debt. He wlbo owns
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the note, owns the mortgage. The assignee of the former is
entitled to the benefits of the latter ; although the assignee did not
know of its existence: Keyes v. Wood, 21 Vermont 331.
But it must be borne in mind that these principles are the outgrowth of equity and equity alone. At common law, choses in
action were not assignable. For the convenience of commerce,
by the statute of Anne, in England, certain choses in action were
made assignable, so as to vest in the assignee the legal title, as
promissory notes and bills of exchange. We have a statute to
the like effect, which provides that any promissory note, bill, bond,
or other instrument in writing, whereby one person promises to
pay another any sum of money, or article of personal property
or sum of money in personal property, shall be assignable by
endorsement thereon. The mortgage, to foreclose which this bill
was filed, was given to secure the payment of a promissory note,
which was assigned by the payee and mortgagee to the complainant. This was in equity, an assignment of the mortgage. The
note was assignable by the statute, but the mortgage was not, nor
was it assignable by the common law. The assignee of a mortgage
has no remedy upon it by law, except it be treated as an absolute
conveyance, and the mortgagee convey the premises by deed.
The Revised Statutes of Colorado (sect. 22, page 377) provide
tht if default be made in the payment of any sum of money
secured by mortgage on lands and tenements duly executed and
recorded, it shall be lawful for the mortgagee, his executors or
administrators, to sue out a writ of scire facias, &c. Here the
remedy is specifically confined to the mortgagee, his executors
and administrators. The assignee cannot proceed at law and sue
out a scire facias; to avail himself of his mortgage security, he
is driven to the Court of Chancery. His remedy is purely equitable, and seeking equity he must be willing to do equity. He who
buys that which is not assignable at law, relying upon a Court
of Chancery to protect and enforce his rights, takes it subject to
-all irfirinities to which it is liable in the hands of the assignor,
and the reason is, that equity will not lend itself to deprive a
party of a right which the law has secured him, if such right is
intrin.ically just of itself.
"Mortgages," says Chief Justice CATON, in Olds v. Cummings, 31 Illinois 192, "are not commercial paper. It is not
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convenient to pass them from hand to hand, performing the real
offices of money in commercial transactions, as notes, bills, and
the like. When one takes an obligation secured by a mortgage,
relying upon the mortgage as security, he must do it deliberately,
and take time to inquire if any reason exists why it should not'
be enforced; while he may take the real promise to pay the
money as commercial paper and depend upon the personal security of the parties to it. It may be said to be a distinguishing
characteristic of commercial paper, that it relies upon personal
security, and is based upon personal credit. It is a part of the
credit system which is said to be the life of commerce, which
requires commercial instruments to pass rapidly from hand to
hand.. Mortgage securities are too cumbersome to answer these
ends. The note itself, though secured by a mortgage, is still
commercial paper, and when the remedy is sought upon that, all
the rights incident to commercial paper will be enforced in the
courts of law. But when the remedy is enforced through the
medium of the mortgage; when that is the foundation of the suit,
and the note is merely used as an incident to ascertain the amount
due on the mortgage, then the courts of equity to which resort is
had, must pause and look deeper into the transaction, and see
if there be any equitable reason why it should not be enforced.
He who holds a note, and also a mortgage, holds in fact two
instruments for the security of the debt: first the note with its
personal security, which is commercial paper and as such may be
enforced in the courts of law, with all the rights incident to such
paper; and the other, the mortgage, with security on land, which
may be enforced in the courts of equity and is subject to the
equities existing between the parties. The right of an assignee
to set at defiance a defence which could be made against the
assignor, is an arbitrary statutory right created for the convenience of commerce alone, and must rely upon the statute for its
support, and is not fostered and encouraged by courts of equity."
This doctrine, so clearly enunciated by Oh. J. CATON, is reasserted and enforced by C. J. WALKER, in the case of Walker v.
Dement, 42 Ill. 273. In delivering the opinion in this latter
case he says: "that while the purchaser of a note, before maturity
without notice, will be protected against all defences to the note,
still, if it is secured by mortgage or other collateral security, the
assignment will not cut off prior equities against the mortgage or
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collateral fund, alth6ugh they might be secret and latent. There
are many cases in which assignees have been protected against
latent equities of third persons, whose rights and even names do
not appear upon the face of the mortgage. And the reason is,
that it is the duty of the purchaser to inquire of the mortgagor
if there be any reason why it should not be paid; but he should
not be required to inquire of the whole world, to see if some one
has not a latent equity, which might be interfered with, by
his purchase of the mortgage, as for instance a cestui que
trust."
In the case of Merry v. Sylburn, 2 Johnson Ch. 441, Chancellor KENT said: "It is a general and well settled principle, that
the assignee of a chose in action takes it subject to the same equities it was subject to in the hands of the assignor. But ttis rule
is generally understood to mean the equity residing in the original
obligor, and not an equity residing in some third person against
the assignor."
In Westfall v. Innes, 23 Barbour 10, the court said: "Does
the plaintiff, being a bond fide purchaser and assignee of the bond
and mortgage, stand in any better condition than the person
from whom he derived his title? It is a well settled principle
that the assignee of a chose in action takes it subject to all
'equities which existed against it in the hands of the assignor."
The same rule is laid down in Pennsylvania in Mott v. Clark,
9 Penn. St. R. 399, and in Pryor v. Wood, 31 Penn. St. R.
142.
It may be objected to these decisions that the mortgage in each
of the cases was given to secure a bond, and that the bond having
no commercial character, the party taking an assignment would
as a matter of course take the mortgage burdened with infirmities
-Thich the statute prescribes shall not apply to negotiable notes,
transferred before due. These cases are made to rest on another
and different ground, namely: that the proceeding was on the
mortgage itself, and there being no express statutory provision
authorizing the assignment of the mortgage. But it may be
urged that the mortgage is accessory to the note; that it is
attached to it; and being so attached it is and must remain
.inseparable. This is true so long as both instruments remain in
the hands of the mortgagee. But when he assigns the note, there
is in law a separation. The assignee can take his note into a
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court of law and recover a judgment upon it, but he cannot take
the mortgage there; he cannot claim the benefits of it there.
He is confined simply to his remedy on the note. Whatever
judgnent he recovers is purely a personal one. He will not be
heard to say that the maker of the note pledged a special fund out of which the debt must be satisfied. The court
could reply and with reason, whatever your rights may be in
equity, one thing is certain: there is no law authorizing your
assignor to transfer to you the mortgage. It does not follow
you into this court.
How is it when he brings his action on the mortgage in a court
of equity? There the mortgage is the foundation of the suit,
and the remedy sought is the foreclosure of the equity of redemption. The note is used to compute the amount; it has no other
office to perform. The mortgage in one sense, and in an important one too, has a character of its own. If one holds a note
against which the Statute of Limitations has run, and also a
mortgage or pledge of real or personal property to secure it, he
cannot sue on the note, but he can take and hold possession of
the property and sell it, if it be personal property, with proper
precautions, and if real property he can have a bill in equity to
foiclose his mortgage, and if his lien fails to pay the whole of his
debt he loses the remainder, because he can have no action upon
it although he may have proper process founded upon the debt
and security to establish his lien and make it available in the
payment of his debt. A mortgage may be enforced so long as it
is available, although the debt secured by it, is barred by the
Statute of Limitations: Parsons on Contracts, vol. ii. 879; 20
Mo. 482; Angell on Limitations, pages 77 and 78. This is
sufficient to show that it has a character of its own. But it may
be urged that if this had been an action at law on the note itself,
that the assignee could not have been chargeable with equities or
defences which might have existed against the same in the hands
of the assignor or original payee, and of which the complainant
was ignorant at the time of assignment, and that it being commercial paper, he could have obtained judgment for the full
amount expressed in the note, and on execution this same land
described in the mortgage might have been levied on and sold to
satisfy the same. Admitting this to be true, yet in that case the
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purchaser of the land under the sale would hold it subject to the
mortgagor's right of redemption: Thornton v. Pegg, 21 Mo. 247.
There is a reason why in an action on the note he would be
entitled-to recover the full amount, namely: a court of law cannot take cogunisance of equities that in a court of chancery would
not only be recognised, but rigorously enforced. The books are
full of cases where a judgment has been rendered in a law court
against a defendant one day, and the same judgment enjoined by
a court of chancery the next. It is' true that the principles
governing and conttolling a court of chancery are as fixed and
certain as are those which control a court of law, and one of those
principles is, that he who invokes its equitable nowers must be
ready to do equity.
But this discussion has already been protracted to a sufficient
length. What was the equity of the mortgagor in this case?
What relation did Jacob B. Carpenter sustain to the wheat and flour
received by him as security in addition to the mortgage, and how
far is the complainant affected thereby. We think it was a
pledge. The contract of pledge is a bailment or delivery of goods
and chattels by one man to another to be bolden as a security for
the payment of a debt or the performance of an engagement and
upon the express or implied understanding that the thing deposited is to be restored to the owner as soon as the debt is discharged or the engagement has been fulfilled. The contract is to
be distinguished from the contract of hypothecation, by the transfer of the possession or the delivery of the thing intended to be
charged to the creditor; and from the contract of mortgage by
the absence of a transfer of the ownership or right of property
therein in the pawnee during the continuance of the trust. If
the thing intended to be burthened with the debt or charge remains
in the possession and under the disposition of the owner there is
no pledge. By a pledge, therefore, of the goods and chattels the
right of possession is altered, but not the right of property.
Were the wheat and flour in the possession and under the control of Jacob B. Carpenter? 'He had the receipt of the warehousemen for it. Mahala Lougen could not have conveyed the same to
any one, freed and discharged from his lien upon it. Miller &
Williams, the warehousemen, were liable to him on their receipt,
for the amount expressed in it. If any one had carried away and
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converted the wheat to his own use, Carpenter could have maintained an action for it, and the production of the receipt in evidence would have been proof of his title. Part of this wheat and
flour, while in the possession and under the control of Jacob B.
Carpenter, and before the assignment of the note, was sold, and
the money paid to Miller & Williams his depositaries. He recognised them as his agents by accepting their receipt. And the
money paid to them for the wheat and flour sold, was equally
under his control, and could have been collected by him. If he
failed to apply this money to the payment of the note and mortgage, and allowed it to remain in their hands until it was dissipated and squandered, he must suffer the loss; not Mahala,
Lougen, who had no right to the possession of it. And if,
in an
action by Jacob B. Carpenter, Mahala Lougen would have been
entitled to recoup the amount of money paid to Miller & Williams'
for the wheat pledged, under the rule we have announced in this
opinion, his assignee stands in no better position, and this-money
so paid must operate as a satisfaction pro tanto of the note and
mortgage.
For the failure of the court below to allow credit on the mortgage for the wheat sold prior to the assignment of the note, this&
case must be reversed and remanded. It is accordingly reversedwith costs, for further proceedings in accordance with this&
opinion.
HALLETT, C. J., dissenting.-The nature of a mortgage and:
its relations to the indebtedness it is intended to secure, arepretty well understood at this day and do not demand much discussion. In Martin v. owlin, 2 Burr. 978, Lord MANSFIELD.
said: "A mortgage is a charge upon the land, and whatever will
give the money will carry the estate in the land along with it to
every purpose. The estate in the land is the same thing as the
money due upon it."

So also KENT, C. J., in Jackson v. Wi/ard, 4 Johns. 43::
"Until foreclosure, or at least until possession taken, the mort-gage remains in the light of a chose in action. It is but an
incident to the debt, and in reason and propriety, it cannot, and'
ought not to be, detached from its principal. The mortgage
interest, as distinct from the debt, is not a fit subject of assi mment. It has no determinate value. If it should be assigned,
VOL. XIX.-42
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the assignee must hold the interest at the will and disposal of the
creditor who holds the bond. 'Acceasorium non ducit 8ed sequitur prhncipale.'"
To the same effect are all the authorities, and no one can now
be found to question the doctrine, that a mortgage is a mere
incident to the indebtedness it is intended to secure, inseparable
from it and incapable of existence without it. It is a truism
of the law, that a mortgage is a security for indebtedness, accompanying the latter through all hands, and ultimately sharing
the same fate. This rule, which identifies the security with
the indebtedness, in my opinion, requires that the remedy upon
the security shall be co-extensive with that on the debt. When
this is denied the mortgage is divested of its character as
a security to the extent of such denial. By the mortgage contract a lien is given upon property for the payment of certain
indebtedness, and if the indebtedness be withdrawn from the lien,
or if the existence of the lien be denied for causes dehors the
mortgage, that instrument is divested of its essential quality in
the face of its express provisions. That is no security for indebtedness which will not come up to the point of contributing
to its payment, and a mortgage intrinsically good, which falls
short of the measure of its principal, is a paradox unknown to the
law. To illustrate, let us look for a moment at the present case.
A negotiable note, secured by mortgage, was endorsed to appellee before maturity upon a valuable consideration. It does
not appear that the pledged property was delivered to appellee,
or that he had any knowledge of it; so that no notice need, be
taken of that feature of the case. Neither law nor equity will
deny to the appellee, as a bond fide holder for value, the full
amount of the note, when that instrument is presented. But it
is said that the action being to foreclose the mortgage, the
amount of the note must be diminished by the sum received by
the payee or his agents before the assignment to appellee. The
mortgage is in itself valid and effectual, according to its legal
character, as a security for the indebtedness evidenced by the
note. The note is intrinsically good, and in the hands of the
appellee constitutes a demand against the appellant for the
amount expressed upon its face. Each instrument is perfect
in itself; the one as a demand against appellant, other as
security for that demand, and yet when -united, and a remedy to
enforce the lien is sought, the security of the mortgage is denied
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as to a portion of that demand. In other words, the mortgage
has ceased to be security as to part of the indebtedness evidenced by the note, its express provisions to the contrary notwithstanding. It appears to me that the mortgage having been
made as a security for the payment of the note, it ought to stand
as a security for the whole note, extinguishable only upon payment of the whole amount recoverable upon it. Any other view
is opposed to the rule which unites the mortgage to the indebtedness inseparably, and gives-to them a common existence. In
this connection I will ask attention to the language of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin upon this subject:" The doctrine that an assignee can enforce the mortgage for no
more than is justly and actually due between the mortgagor and
the mortgagee had its origin at a time when the practice of giving
mortgages as collateral security for the payment of negotiable
paper was wholly unknown, and was made to rest upon the ground
that such would be the rule adopted in a suit at law, upon the
covenant or bond to which the mortgage was collateral; and the
assignee should stand no better in equity than at law. The reason of the rule being, that because in a suit at law for the use of
the assignee upon the bond or covenant, to collect the debt, a
recovery cannot be had for a greater sum than is actually due
from the mortgagor to the mortgagee, therefore no more shall
be recovered in equity in an action to foreclose the mortgage; or
that the parties as to rights and remedies shall stand upon the
same footing in both courts: it follows as a logical conclusion,
that when the nature of the instrument evidencing the debt and
the circumstances of the transfer are such that in a suit at law
upon it against the mortgagor, the assignee can enforce its payment regardless of any equities existing between the mortgagor
and mortgagee, he should have the same rights and remedy in
equity. The reason of the rule ceasing in the case of negotiable
securities, transferred before maturity and without notice, the
rule also ceases. The debt is the principal thing, the mortgage
the incident. The transfer of the debt carries with it the mortgage. It is the debt which gives character to the mortgage, and
fixes the rights and remedies of the parties under it, and not the
mortgage which determines the nature of the debt:" Croft v.
Bunster, 9 Wis. 509. See also Dutton v. Ives, 5 Mich. 519;
Beeves v. Scully, Walker's Oh. 248.
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Another consideration of great weight ought not to pass unnoticed. It is conceded that the appellee may recover in an action
at law upon this note, that portion of his demand which is denied to
him in this proceeding. It was said by HoSMER, C. J., in Clark
v. Beach, 6 Conn. 159, "The equitable doctrine, concerning
the rights of mortgagor and mortgagee, has gradually been
naturalized in the common-law code; and by the adoption of
principles long established in chancery, and tenaciously adhered
to, the suitors are not driven from one bar by increased litigation
and expense to obtain infallible relief at another."
The policy of the law, here defined, has not, I think, been
heeded in this case. The appellant is protected from the
payment of a portion of the appellee's demand to which she must
hereafter respond in a court of law; while the appellee is driven
from this bar by increased litigation and expense to obtain infallible relief at another.
The case of Olds v. Cummings, 31 Ill. 188, is the authority
upon which the decision of this court is based, and that case is
grounded upon the assumption that a foreclosure suit is brought
upon a mortgage only. The court in that case say: "The note
itself, though secured by a mortgage, is still commercial paper,
and when the remedy is sought upon that, all the rights incident
to commercial paper, will be enforced in the courts of law. But
when the remedy is sought, through the medium of the mortgage,
when that is the foundation of the suit, and the note is merely
used as an incident to ascertain the amount due upon the mortgage, then the courts of equity, to which resort is had, must
pause and look deeper into the transaction, and see if there be
any equitable reason why it should not be enforced."
Upon this, I am of opinion, that a foreclosure is founded upon
the indebtedness, as well as the mortgage. A court of equity
will not, and in the nature of things cannot permit a mortgagee to
recover unless he is the holder of the indebtedness, secured by
the mortgage: 1 Hilliard on Mortgages, Chap 2, s. 5.
Whether the proceedings be'at law or in equity, the indebtedness is the principal thing, for both remedies are designed to
enforce payment of the money. I concede that the remedy at
law is upon the note alone, but it is equally plain that the suit in
equity is founded upon the note and mortgage, and that each is
The indebtedness is the
essential to the right of recovery.
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encumbrance, and the mbrtgage is the means by which the
encumbrance is attached to the estate. If either be removed
there is nothing remaining upon which the court can act. In a
proceeding to foreclose a mortgage, it is the duty of the court to
ascertain the amount of the indebtedness as well as to enforce
the lien upon the mortgaged property for its payment, and while
the mortgage will show the lien, it js rarely evidence of the'
indebtedness.
Sometimes a covenant for the payment of the
money is inserted in the mortgage, but usually a bond, note, or
other separate instrument is executed for the purpose of showing
the amount of the indebtedness. When the indebtedness is evidenced by a separate instrument, a court of equity is as much
bound to give effect to that instrument as to the mortgage.
In this case the note is evidence of the amount of the indebtedness, just as the mortgage is evidence of a lien upon certain
property for the payment of that indebtedness; and the court is
bound to give effect to the first as well as the second. The note
is the legal and unquestionable evidence of the indebtedness, as
the mortgage is evidence of the lien; and each, according to its
office, determines the rights of the parties. It is impossible to
say that there is anything due upon the mortgage disconnected
from the note, for the reason that the note alone determines the
amount of the indebtedness.
The Supreme Court of Illinois say that the note is "merely
used as an incident to ascertain the amount due upon the mortgage." But it is plain that no such use was made of the note in
that case. The note called for the amount expressed upon its
face, but the court refused to recognise the demand. The mort-.
gage referred to the note as the standard of indebtedness, but
the court rejected the note in violation of the express language
of the mortgage. And this was done for the avowed purpose
of protecting the mortgagor from making payment to the innocent holder of negotiable paper. I am not able to perceive that
the former occupies a higher position in a court of equity than
the latter, or that there is any reason for setting aside the rules
of law applicable to commercial paper in cases of this kind.
The opinion of that court, as well as that announced by this
court, is open to other criticism; but I think that I have shown
that the ruling of the District Court was correct, and that the
decree of that court should be affirmed.

